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In bifurcated  patent  litigation  systems,  claims  of  infringement  and validity  of  a patent  are
decided  independently  of  each  other  in  separate  court  proceedings  at  different  courts.
In  non-bifurcated  systems,  infringement  and  validity  are  decided  jointly  in  the  same
proceedings  at  a single  court.  We  build  a model  that  shows  the  key  trade-off  between
bifurcated  and  non-bifurcated  systems  and  how  it affects  the  incentives  of  plaintiffs  and
defendants  in patent  infringement  cases.  Using  detailed  data  on patent  litigation  cases  in
Germany  (bifurcated)  and  the  U.K.  (non-bifurcated),  we  show  that  bifurcation  creates  sit-
uations in  which  a  patent  is  held  infringed  that  is  subsequently  invalidated.  We  also  show
that having  to  challenge  a patent’s  validity  in separate  court  proceedings  under  bifurcation
implies  that alleged  infringers  are  less  likely  to do so. We  ﬁnd  this  to  apply  in particular  to
more  resource-constrained  alleged  infringers.  Finally,  we  ﬁnd  parties  to  be  more  likely  to
settle in  a bifurcated  system.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Patents are probabilistic property rights: there exists inherent uncertainty regarding a patent’s validity and scope (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2005). Although patents are granted by patent ofﬁces only after substantive examination, there is no guarantee
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hat a granted patent is in fact valid.1 We  show that the uncertainty that surrounds the validity of patents has important
ffects on patent enforcement and hence on the functioning of the patent system as a whole.
In patent litigation, patent holders allege the infringement of their patent right while defendants can deny infringement
nd challenge the validity of the patent in question. In many legal systems, such as the U.K., Italy, or Switzerland, the
nfringement and validity claims are decided simultaneously in the same court proceedings where the invalidation of a
atent renders infringement impossible. In many other jurisdictions, including the U.S., Germany, and China, there is some
eparation of patent infringement and validity proceedings – so-called bifurcation.2 The purpose of this paper is to analyze
he effect of bifurcation on litigation behavior and outcomes.
Using detailed case-level data from German courts where infringement and validity are separated into independent
roceedings, we show that in practice the decision on infringement is often made and enforced before validity has been
etermined under the presumption that granted patents are indeed valid. We  show that this leads to situations in which a
atent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. Our data on infringement and invalidity proceedings in Germany
or 2000 to 2008 reveal that 12% of infringement cases with parallel invalidity proceedings (41% if we  focus on cases without
ettlements) produce divergent, i.e., ‘invalid but infringed’, decisions (for examples see Table A-1 in the online appendix). Our
nalysis also shows that the length of this injunction gap is substantial. In cases where validity was  challenged in court, the
nfringement decision was on average enforceable for more than a year before the patent was  invalidated in ﬁrst instance.
We build a theoretical model that illustrates the key trade-offs between bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems. First, our
odel incorporates the possibility of an injunction gap in the bifurcated system. In addition, challenging a patent’s validity
equires additional costs in the bifurcated system compared to non-bifurcated systems because validity has to be challenged
n separate proceedings at a different court. At the same time, bifurcated systems allow for specialization of infringement
nd invalidity courts. In particular the question of validity requires in-depth technical expertise, which courts that focus on
nvalidity in a bifurcated system are rather able to provide. This leads presumably to a lower incidence of errors, in particular
ype I errors, i.e., fewer invalid patents are erroneously maintained in force.
Our model shows that the separation between validity and infringement reduces the likelihood that an alleged infringer
hallenges a patent’s validity. We  conﬁrm that this holds in practice by comparing the likelihood of validity challenges
etween infringement cases in Germany and the U.K. (a non-bifurcated system where infringement and validity challenges
re decided in the same proceedings).3 The results show that alleged infringers in the U.K. are signiﬁcantly more likely
o challenge a patent’s validity than alleged infringers in Germany. We  also ﬁnd empirical evidence that in Germany, in
articular smaller ﬁrms are less likely to ﬁle an invalidity action when they are sued for infringement. We  ﬁnd no evidence
hat this is also the case in the U.K. These ﬁndings suggest that more resource-constrained ﬁrms are less likely to challenge
 patent’s validity in a bifurcated litigation system. The broader implications of this effect are twofold: on the one hand the
hare of cases where an infringed patent is invalidated is downward biased under bifurcation; on the other hand the strong
resumption of validity that is built into the bifurcated litigation system becomes self-reinforcing.
Our model also allows us to compare settlement behavior under the bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems. The model
hows that the effect of bifurcation on the extent of adverse selection and its effect on the joint surplus from settlement (the
art of the joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder) are the two  key drivers of the impact of bifurcation
n the settlement rate (settlement amount). Depending on the signs and magnitudes of these two  effects, bifurcation can
ither lead to a higher or lower settlement rate (settlement amount). A comparison of settlement behavior between German
nd U.K. cases reveals that signiﬁcantly fewer cases settle in the U.K. We  also ﬁnd some evidence that smaller, more resource-
onstrained ﬁrms in Germany are less likely to settle.
Our research contributes to the existing literature on the design and functioning of patent litigation systems by offering
or the ﬁrst time quantitative evidence on the implications of the separation of infringement and validity. This is not only
f direct relevance to Germany, where by far the largest number of patent cases in Europe are litigated (Cremers et al.,
016), but also played an important role in the current heated discussion about the design of the Uniﬁed Patent Court (UPC)
n Europe. For example, a group of large ﬁrms across industries, including Adidas, Apple, Deutsche Post DHL, Google, and
amsung,4 issued a joint statement in 2014 voicing concerns that “[...] the potential exists for a court to order an injunction
rohibiting the importation and sale of goods even though the patent may  ultimately be found invalid. This result unduly
educes competition, can increase the cost of products in the market and reduce product choices, all negatively impacting
onsumers.”
Apart from its relevance for Germany and the European UPC, our research provides important insights also for countries
hat rely on similar bifurcated litigation systems, including some of the world’s top patenting countries, such as China,
1 Mann and Underweiser (2012), for example, show that since 2003 the U.S. Federal Circuit has held nearly 60% of patents invalid.
2 Germany and China have bifurcated systems in which separate courts decide independently on patent infringement and validity. In the U.S., courts
ecide on both infringement and invalidity simultaneously. However, the Inter Partes Review (IPR) which was  introduced by the America Invents Act (AIA)
n  September 2012 as a way of challenging validity administratively at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce post-grant has de facto introduced bifurcation
nto  the U.S. system (Chien and Helmers, 2015). In 2013, roughly a third of litigated patents in the U.S. were challenged through an IPR.
3 The U.K. comprises separate legal systems: England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Our data focus on England & Wales where the overwhelming
ajority of cases occur.
4 The complete list is: Adidas, AFDEL, Apple, ARM, BlackBerry, Broadcom, Bull, Cisco Systems, Dell, Deutsche Post DHL, ESIA, Google, HP, Huawei, Microsoft,
amsung, SFIB, Telecom Italia, and Vodafone.
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Japan, and Korea. It also informs jurisdictions that allow for some intermediate degree of separation between infringement
and validity. In the U.S., for example, validity challenges in form of an Inter Partes Review (IPR) are decided faster than
infringement cases at district courts.5 Hence, bifurcation in the U.S. means that validity is decided ﬁrst. Our analysis suggests
that this avoids the problem of the injunction gap associated with the German type of bifurcation. Further research could
investigate whether the separation of invalidity and infringement decisions introduced by the IPR may  even be beneﬁcial.
Taking a broader perspective, our evidence underscores the probabilistic nature of patents. We  show that patents that a
court presumes valid when deciding on infringement often turn out to be invalid upon closer scrutiny. Patents involved in
court disputes are only the tip of the patent iceberg and clearly a non-random selection. Regardless, our evidence supports
the general view that legal rights in form of patents are inherently associated with enormous uncertainty. We also show
that bifurcation compounds the undersupply of validity challenges in court that has been shown to exist in non-bifurcated
systems (Farrell and Merges, 2004). This means that the strong presumption of validity of a probabilistic right, which is built
into the bifurcated litigation system, distorts incentives to the patent holder’s advantage. Our evidence also suggests that
this affects in particular smaller companies as they are less likely to defend themselves against potential patent infringement
by challenging the patent’s validity. A resulting increased likelihood of facing an injunction for patent infringement may
well impact the behavior of smaller companies, it might in particular affect their innovative activity.
Our ﬁndings also add to the existing literature on the settlement of patent disputes. Galasso and Schankerman (2010),
for example, suggest that the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) – which was perceived as
patentee-friendly – led to more settlements early on in a patent dispute because of reduced uncertainty over the outcome
of a case. Our ﬁnding that parties are more likely to settle in a bifurcated litigation system due to the lower rate of Type I
errors is consistent with the evidence provided by Galasso and Schankerman (2010). Our analysis, therefore, offers empirical
evidence directly relevant for the long-standing, largely theoretical debate on the design of patent (enforcement) systems
and its effect on companies (Aoki and Hu, 1999; Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Boyce and Hollis,
2007; Eckert and Langinier, 2013).
Our analysis is also related to the law and economics literature on the design of litigation systems more generally.
Speciﬁcally, there is a theoretical literature on sequential vs. unitary trials (Landes, 1993, 1998; Chen et al., 1997). This
literature distinguishes more generally between unitary and sequential trials, where in a sequential trial the legal dispute
is broken up into multiple dispositive issues – for example the separation between liability and damages in tort cases in
the U.S. The court’s decision at each stage of the sequential trial inﬂuences the subsequent stage, either directly by shutting
the door to proceeding with the next stage or by revealing information about the expected outcome of the next stage.6 Our
setting differs substantially because the trial on the second issue (invalidity) is initiated before the trial on the ﬁrst issue
(infringement) has been decided. Also, the separate trials take place at different courts which increases the additional costs
involved in the second (invalidity) trial. Moreover, the second action (invalidity) is taken by the defendant, not the plaintiff
in the infringement suit. As such our analysis also contributes to the literature on unitary vs. sequential trials by extending
the framework to a setting where a trial is broken into overlapping dispositive issues. Moreover, the analysis of sequential
vs. unitary trials so far has been characterized by a complete lack of empirical evidence. As such our empirical analysis offers
for the ﬁrst time empirical evidence on the implications of sequential trials.
Finally, our analysis is also related to the law and economics literature on judicial errors (Png, 1986; Lando, 2006; Rizzolli
and Stanca, 2012). Our setting offers a novel perspective on the issue. We  show that there is a trade-off in the bifurcated
system between a lower probability of a Type I error in the invalidity decision on the one hand, and on the other a higher
likelihood of a Type I error in the infringement decision due to the lower likelihood of challenging validity. In other words,
conditional on challenging validity, the bifurcated system generates fewer false positives (i.e. more likely to invalidate an
invalid patent), but the large cost of challenging validity means that alleged infringers might be found to infringe a patent
that would have been invalidated, had its validity been challenged (false positive in the infringement decision).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a short description of the German and U.K.
patent litigation systems with particular focus on the interplay between infringement and invalidity proceedings. Section 3
discusses our theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 5 presents our empirical ﬁndings
and Section 6 offers some concluding thoughts and suggestions for further research. An extensive online appendix provides
additional information and analysis.
2. Bifurcated vs. non-bifurcated patent litigation systemsThis section explains the design of the German bifurcated patent litigation system as well as the U.K. non-bifurcated
system with the discussion focusing on the separation of infringement and invalidity claims.
5 In any case, infringement cases are usually stayed pending an IPR.
6 Following Landes (1993), in this literature German bifurcation could be classiﬁed as some type of “reverse bifurcation” as validity, which can prevent
the  infringement suit from proceeding is decided after infringement.
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.1. Germany’s bifurcated patent litigation system
.1.1. Court system
Regional courts (Landgerichte – LGs) have jurisdiction over patent infringement.7 There are 12 regional courts that serve as
rst instance courts in infringement proceedings.8 A panel of three legally trained judges decide on infringement. Decisions
y the regional courts can be appealed before a higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht – OLG). In exceptional cases, a further
ppeal can be brought before the Patent Division of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) in third
nstance.
A patent’s validity is challenged either through opposition ﬁled at the patent ofﬁce which granted the patent right
European Patent Ofﬁce – EPO – for EP patents or Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt – DPMA – for DE patents) or through an
nvalidity action ﬁled at the German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht – BPatG).9 As a specialized court, the BPatG
eploys judges with both legal and technical training.10 Appeals to the decisions by the BPatG are directly brought before the
atent Division of the BGH that reviews infringement proceedings. The structure of the German court system is summarized
n Fig. A-1 in the online appendix, and online Appendix A provides more details on infringement and invalidity proceedings.
.1.2. Interaction of infringement and invalidity proceedings
If a patent is invalidated, any pending infringement proceedings based on the patent will be dismissed. This still allows
or situations where decisions on infringement can be (preliminarily) enforced based on an invalid patent if infringement is
ecided before invalidity is. The occurrence of such divergent decisions crucially depends on (a) the timing and (b) duration
f infringement and invalidity proceedings:
(a) Mostly ﬁled as a defensive reaction to an infringement action, validity challenges are usually ﬁled after the corresponding
infringement proceedings.11 Fig. A-3 in the online appendix shows the time lag between the ﬁling of infringement and
invalidity actions in our data. We  ﬁnd that more than 55% of parallel invalidity proceedings are initiated at least four
months after the infringement proceeding.
b) Invalidity proceedings take signiﬁcantly longer than infringement proceedings in ﬁrst instance (see Fig. A-4 in the online
appendix), thus increasing the temporal spread between the decisions. Opposition proceedings also take signiﬁcantly
longer than infringement proceedings. The litigants may  request acceleration of the proceeding, still, an opposition takes
on average 20–30 months.12
In combination, (a) and (b) imply in practice that decisions on invalidity follow infringement decisions with a considerable
ag.
The alleged infringer may  request to stay the infringement proceeding until a decision on validity is available (see Fig. 1).
n practice, infringement courts rely by case law on a strong presumption of validity. That is, infringement proceedings are
nly stayed if there is an overwhelmingly large probability that the patent will not be upheld in its current form. So, even
hough the judges at the infringement court do not consider the validity of the patent in their judgment on infringement,
hey have to form an opinion on the likelihood of invalidity to decide on a stay (Fock and Bartenbach, 2010). This poses a
onsiderable challenge as infringement court judges are rarely technically trained and limited resources restrict a thorough
nvestigation of the patent’s validity. Usually, the corresponding validity challenges are not yet at a stage where they could
rovide guidance on the likelihood of invalidity. Infringement court judges are therefore forced to stay at their own  discretion.
If decisions on infringement are made faster than decisions on validity, a court may  establish infringement although the
atent is eventually invalidated. In fact, in Germany, if infringement is found in ﬁrst instance, any injunction resulting from
his decision is enforceable regardless of an appeal or any pending validity challenge. This means the greater the temporal
pread between infringement and validity decisions, the longer a patent may  be wrongfully enforced. Even if the patent is
nvalidated in ﬁrst instance, the patent holder can continue to enforce the patent as long as the decision is not binding. This
njunction gap may, therefore, extend beyond the ﬁrst instance invalidity decision. This creates strong incentives to appeal
he infringement decision while awaiting the outcome of the validity challenge. The result is considerable legal uncertainty
ver the outcome of the infringement dispute, potential delays in enforcement, increased litigation costs, and the possibility
f an injunction gap.
7 Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the DPMA (DE) or the EPO with effect for Germany (EP).
8 These are the regional courts in Berlin, Braunschweig, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Munich, Nuremberg-
urth,  and Saarbrücken. Each regional court has at least one chamber primarily designated to patent cases.
9 The responsibilities of the BPatG are twofold. It serves as the appeals court for decisions of the DPMA concerning DE patent applications, and it hears
nvalidity actions for DE and EP (with effect for Germany) patents.
10 The panel consists of ﬁve judges: three technically trained judges as well as two  legally trained judges.
11 This is often due to the time required to prepare the case, in particular the search for prior art that can be used to challenge the patent’s validity (Kühnen,
013).
12 Harhoff et al. (2007) reports a median length of opposition proceedings at the EPO of about four years (including appeal).
222 K. Cremers et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131 (2016) 218–242Fig. 1. Timing of infringement and invalidity proceedings in bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems.
2.2. U.K.’s non-bifurcated patent litigation system
In the U.K. patent disputes are heard exclusively by two  courts,13 the Patents County Court (PCC), which was renamed to
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) at the end of 2013,14 and the Patents Court, a specialist court part of the High
Court of England and Wales (see Fig. A-2 in the online appendix).15 Both courts are located in London. The IPEC generally
hears cases of lower value and complexity, with total recoverable costs and damages capped at £50,000 and £500,000
respectively. In both courts, cases are decided by a single, technically trained judge. Appeals are heard by the Court of Appeal
(CA) and in exceptional cases by the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords).
The U.K. patent litigation system is non-bifurcated, which means that infringement and invalidity claims are decided
simultaneously (see Fig. 1). As a result, if a patent is invalidated by the court, it cannot be found to be infringed. Therefore,
the invalid but infringed scenario cannot arise in the non-bifurcated system. That said, invalidity challenges still have to be
raised as counterclaims and pursued by the defendants.16 The structure of the U.K. court system is summarized in Fig. A-2
in the online appendix, and online Appendix B offers more details on the U.K. litigation system.
3. Model
This section presents a model that illustrates the key trade-off between bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems and
explores its implications on parties’ incentives to sue for patent infringement, challenge validity, and settle the case.
3.1. Litigation in the non-bifurcated system
We  consider a patent holder (plaintiff) P and an alleged infringer (defendant) D. The patent holder can decide whether to
sue the alleged infringer. If he does so, the alleged infringer can ﬁle a counterclaim to invalidate the patent. In this section
we consider a non-bifurcated litigation system: whenever the patent’s validity is challenged, the issues of infringement and
validity are decided simultaneously by the same court. Hence, we assume that the alleged infringer does not need to incur
any additional litigation costs to challenge the patent’s validity.
Denote CP and CD the litigation costs of the patent holder and the alleged infringer, respectively. Furthermore, denote 
the probability that a court ﬁnds the defendant to infringe the patent and ˛nb the probability that the patent’s validity is
upheld by the court if challenged. If the court ﬁnds that the patent is invalid, the alleged infringer gets a payoff ID, which
13 Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the U.K. Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (GB) or the EPO with effect for the U.K. (EP).
14 The PCC/IPEC underwent a series of comprehensive reforms between 2010 and 2013 which are described in Fox (2014) and Helmers et al. (2015).
15 Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the U.K. Intellectual Property Ofﬁce or the EPO with effect for the U.K. Note that the U.K.
Intellectual Property ofﬁce does not grant utility models.
16 Note that validity of EP patents can also be challenged through opposition at the EPO, but there is no opposition procedure for national patents with
the  U.K. Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (although there is a procedure via its opinion service).
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s allowed to be either positive, negative or zero,17 while the patent holder incurs a loss LP (i.e., gets a payoff −LP).18 If the
ourt ﬁnds that the patent is valid and infringed, the patent holder derives a beneﬁt BP,19 while the infringer incurs a loss
D (i.e., gets a payoff −LD).20 If the court ﬁnds that the patent is valid but not infringed, we  assume that neither the alleged
nfringer nor the patent holder are affected by this decision. The probability of infringement  ∈
(
, 
]
is known to the
lleged infringer while the patent holder only knows that it is drawn from a uniform distribution over
(
, 
]
.
The timing of the game is as follows:
tage 1: The patent holder P decides whether to sue the alleged infringer D. If he does not sue for infringement, the game
ends. If he does, the game proceeds to the next stage.
tage 2: The alleged infringer D decides whether to challenge the patent’s validity.
tage 3: The court hands down its judgment regarding infringement and validity if the patent’s validity was challenged. in
Stage 2. Otherwise, the court hands down its judgment regarding the infringement claim.
Consider ﬁrst the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge the patent’s validity. If the alleged infringer decides to ﬁle an
nvalidity counterclaim in Stage 2, his expected payoff is given by −˛nbLD + (1 − ˛nb)ID − CD, while his expected payoff if he
ecides not to do so is −LD − CD. Therefore, the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s validity if and only if
−˛nbLD +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
ID − CD > −LD − CD
hich is the same as
ID > −LD
Since  ∈
(
, 
]
, the latter holds if and only if
 > ˜nb ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if  >
−ID
LD
−ID
LD
if
−ID
LD
∈
[
, 
)
 if  ≤ −ID
LD
When ˜nb = , the alleged infringer always challenges the patent’s validity. If −ID/LD ∈
[
, 
)
, he does so only when the
robability of infringement is large enough. Finally, if ˜nb = , he never challenges the patent’s validity.
Let us now consider the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement. The patent holder’s expected payoff from
uing the alleged infringer is
1
 − 
{∫ ˜nb

(
BP − CP
)
d +
∫ 
˜nb
[
˛nbBP −
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP − CP
]
d
}
= 1
 − 
{(
1 − ˛nb
)[BP
2
(
˜nb
)2 + LP ˜nb − LP]
+˛
nbBP
2

2 − BP
2
2
}
− CP
ecause the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s validity if and only if  > ˜nb. Therefore, the patent holder will sue the
lleged infringer if and only ifCP ≤
1
 − 
{(
1 − ˛nb
)[BP
2
(
˜nb
)2 + LP ˜nb − LP]+ ˛nbBP2 2 − BP2 2
}
≡ C˜nbP (1)
17 One reason why  ID can be negative is that invalidating a patent is similar to removing an entry barrier, which may  hurt both the patent holder and the
lleged infringer. The payoff ID can be positive if the patent’s invalidation allows the alleged infringer to save some costs he was incurring to build around
he  patent and reduce the probability of infringing it. Another reason why ID can be positive is that the alleged infringer may be using a technology that
e  was unable to license to third parties when the patent was still presumed valid (because potential licensees fear infringing that patent) but that he can
icense if the patent is invalidated. Finally, if the patent holder was  “hiding” his patent and shows up only after the alleged infringer has made an action
hat  could infringe the patent, it is reasonable to assume that ID = 0.
18 The patent holder may  incur this loss because current licensees will stop paying their license fees.
19 The beneﬁt BP may capture for instance the damages paid by the infringer and/or additional market proﬁts resulting from an injunction.
20 The loss LD may  capture for instance the damages paid to the patent holder and/or any loss in market proﬁts due to an injunction.
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3.2. Litigation in the bifurcated system
In the bifurcated litigation system, validity and infringement of a patent are decided separately and independently. We
assume that two different courts deal with infringement and validity and that the court dealing with infringement hands
down its judgment ﬁrst. To account for the main features of the bifurcated system, we modify the benchmark setting above
in a number of ways. First, we consider an alternative timing:
Stage 1: The patent holder P decides whether to sue the alleged infringer D. If he does not sue for infringement, the game
ends. If he does, the game proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 2: The alleged infringer D decides whether to challenge the patent’s validity.
Stage 3: The court dealing with infringement hands down its judgment.
Stage 4: The court dealing with validity hands down its judgment if the patent’s validity was challenged in Stage 2.
Second, we assume that challenging the patent’s validity before another court requires additional litigation cost cD for the
alleged infringer. Third, we assume that when the patent is found infringed and eventually invalidated, the alleged infringer
gets a payoff ID − lD where lD ≥ 0 (instead of ID under the non-bifurcated system), and the patent holder receives a payoff
bP − LP where bP ≥ 0 (instead of −LP under the non-bifurcated system). This captures the fact that during the period between
the decisions by the two  courts (the injunction gap), the patent holder may  be able to enforce his patent, for instance through
an injunction.21
Finally, assume that the probability that the patent’s validity is upheld under the bifurcated system, which we  denote
˛b, is smaller than the corresponding probability under the non-bifurcated system: ˛b ≤ ˛nb. This captures the fact that a
non-specialized court is more likely to make a Type I error when assessing the validity of a patent. It is indeed reasonable
to assume that a specialized court is rather able to assess the relevance of prior art to invalidate the patent than a non-
specialized court.22 Note that, in our model, the non-bifurcated system can be regarded as a special case of the bifurcated
system in which cD = 0, lD = 0, bP = 0, and ˛b = ˛nb.
In this setting, the alleged infringer will challenge the patent’s validity if and only if his expected payoff from doing so
−˛bLD + 
(
1 − ˛b
)
(ID − lD) + (1 − )
(
1 − ˛b
)
ID − CD − cD
is greater than his expected payoff from facing the infringement suit without challenging the patent’s validity, i.e., −LD − CD.
Hence, the patent’s validity will be challenged if and only if
 >
−ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
Since  ∈
(
, 
]
, the latter holds if and only if
 > ˜b ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if  >
−ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
−ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
if
−ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
∈
[
, 
)
 if  ≤ −ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
Let us now examine the patent holder’s decision to sue for infringement. If validity is challenged then the patent holder’s
expected payoff is
˛bBp + 
(
1 − ˛b
)
(bP − LP) −
(
1 − 
)  (
1 − ˛b
)
LP − CP
which can be rewritten as
(
˛bBp +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
)
−
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP − CP
21 In Germany, the alleged infringer may  seek compensation after the patent is invalidated but is typically unable to get full compensation (see also
Section  2.1.2).
22 A key argument for specialization is that sufﬁcient judicial expertise with the law as well as with technology is crucial for accurate decision-making in
patent  litigation (cf. Moore, 2001; Pegram, 2000; Kesan and Ball, 2011). In particular, in order to accurately determine a patent’s validity, judges require
a  sound understanding of the relevant, potentially invalidating, prior art. This usually requires in-depth knowledge of the corresponding technology ﬁeld.
Inline  with this argument, we assume that judges at specialized courts are more likely to have that knowledge thanks to their technical background and
training. They are also in a better position to accumulate technological expertise due to their focus on patent validity.
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Thus, the patent holder’s expected payoff from suing the alleged infringer is
1
 − 
{∫ ˜b

BPd +
∫ 
˜b
[

(
˛bBP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
)
−
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
]
d
}
− CP =
1
 − 
{(
1 − ˛b
)[ (BP − bP)
2
(
˜b
)2
+LP ˜b − LP
]
+
˛bBP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
2

2 − BP
2
2
}
− CP
ecause the alleged infringer challenges the patent’s validity if and only if  > ˜b. Therefore, the patent holder will sue the
lleged infringer if and only if
CP ≤
1
 − 
{(
1 − ˛b
)[ (BP − bP)
2
(
˜b
)2 + LP ˜b − LP]+ ˛bBP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
2

2 − BP
2
2
}
≡ C˜bP (2)
.3. Comparison of the two systems
Let us ﬁrst compare the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge validity under the two systems. This boils down to
omparing the thresholds ˜nb and ˜b.
We  need to distinguish two cases:
 If ID > 0 then ˜nb =  ≤ ˜b.
 If ID ≤ 0 then
−ID
LD
≤ −ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
which yields
˜nb = min
(
max
(−ID
LD
, 
)
, 
)
≤ min
(
max
(
−ID
LD − lD
+ cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
, 
)
, 
)
= ˜b
Thus, in both cases, it holds that ˜nb ≤ ˜b, which yields the following result:
roposition 1. Bifurcation has a negative effect on the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge the patent’s validity.
Let us now compare the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement under both systems. To do that, we  need to
ompare the thresholds C˜nbP and C˜
b
P .
From (2) it follows that C˜bP increases with ˛
b and bP and decreases with cD (because ˜b increases with cD). This, combined
ith the fact that C˜nbP is equal to C˜
b
P in the special case ˛
b = ˛nb, bP = 0 and cD = 0, shows that a switch from the non-bifurcated
ystem to the bifurcated system affects the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement through two  opposite forces:
 The existence of an injunction gap (and more precisely the beneﬁt bP the patent holder derives from it) and the deter-
rence effect of the additional cost cD to challenge the patent’s validity increases the patent holder’s incentives to sue for
infringement.
 The decrease in Type I errors (and the corresponding decrease in the probability that the patent’s validity is upheld by the
court) decreases the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement.
These two opposite forces capture the trade-off induced by bifurcation from the patent holder’s perspective. Whether
he patent holder will have higher or lower incentives to sue for infringement under the bifurcated system (i.e. whether C˜bP
s higher or lower than C˜nbP ) depends on the relative magnitude of these two forces: the higher bP and cD (the lower ˛
b), the
igher (lower) the likelihood that bifurcation will result in more infringement suits.
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Thus, we get the following result:
Proposition 2. Bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on the patent holder’s incentives to sue for infringement.
3.4. Testable predictions
Proposition 2 produces ambiguous predictions regarding the decision to sue for patent infringement. Unfortunately, this
prediction is not empirically testable because it would require data on the population of patent disputes. However, only
disputes that are litigated in court are visible, hence we are unable to compute the patent holder’s propensity to sue for
infringement.
In contrast, our model (Proposition 1) generates a clear-cut result regarding the effect of bifurcation on validity challenges
which leads to a prediction that can be tested using the available data:
Prediction 1: Alleged infringers challenge patent validity less often under a bifurcated system than under a non-bifurcated
system.
In our model, the alleged infringer’s incentives to challenge validity depends on his litigation costs under the bifurcated
system (through the additional cost cD he has to incur to ﬁle an invalidity counterclaim in a different court), while this is
not true under the non-bifurcated system. This implies that the alleged infringer’s characteristics that affect his litigation
costs (in particular cD) should affect his incentives to challenge validity under the bifurcated system but not under the
non-bifurcated system. We  focus here on the effect of the defendant’s size sD on these incentives.
More speciﬁcally, we make the following assumption: other things equal, smaller defendants incur higher litigation costs,
i.e. ∂cD/∂sD < 0. Smaller ﬁrms are commonly seen as more resource-constrained due to higher capital costs (Carpenter and
Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that several studies have found that patent litigation places a
heavier burden on smaller companies (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2009; Bessen and Meurer,
2013). Greenhalgh et al. (2010) offer direct qualitative survey-based evidence that indicates that the burden imposed by
patent litigation costs is inversely proportional to ﬁrm size. In particular, time and management resources that have to be
dedicated to litigation weigh heavier on small companies. Small ﬁrms are also less likely to afford in-house legal counsel,
which further increases their costs of litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
Under the above assumption, the threshold ˜b above which an alleged infringer decides to challenge validity increases
with his size sD. Therefore, our model generates the following testable prediction:
Prediction 2: Other things equal, smaller defendants are less likely to challenge validity under the bifurcated system,
while the size of alleged infringers does not affect their incentives to challenge validity under the non-bifurcated system.
3.5. Extension: settlement
In an extension of the model, we allow the patent holder and the alleged infringer to reach a settlement before the
court judgment. More speciﬁcally, we allow the patent holder to make a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the alleged
infringer before the latter decides whether to ﬁle an invalidity counterclaim. Given that the alleged infringer has private
information about the infringement probability, the settlement subgame is a screening game in which the patent holder
makes a settlement offer which is accepted (turned down) by defendants that have a probability of infringement above
(below) a critical threshold. We  characterize the equilibrium settlement amount and critical threshold under both systems
and compare them.
We  consider the following extension of the game studied above:
Stage 1: P decides whether to ﬁle an infringement claim. If he does not, the game ends; otherwise, it proceeds to the next
stage.
Stage 2: P makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to D.23
Stage 3: D decides whether to accept the offer. If it is accepted, the game ends; otherwise it proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 4: P decides whether to drop the infringement case. If he does, the game ends; otherwise, the patent holder and the
alleged infringer incur litigation costs CP and CD, respectively, and the game proceeds to the next stage.
Stage 5: D decides whether to challenge the patent’s validity (before the same court under the non-bifurcated system and
before a different court under the bifurcated system).
Stage 6: Court decisions regarding infringement, and validity if challenged, are handed down.24
23 We focus on settlements that occur after a claim is ﬁled because these are the only ones that we can observe in the data.
24 For the sake of exposition, we present a uniﬁed model in which court decisions are handed down in the same stage under both systems. Since the
courts  are not strategic players in our setting, modeling their actions as simultaneous moves under the bifurcated system (rather than sequential moves)
leads  to the same outcomes as long all the payoff functions remain the same.
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As is standard in the theoretical literature on settlement,25 we  assume that the patent holder’s litigation threat is always
redible. This holds true under both the bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems if the following (sufﬁcient) conditions hold
−CP + ˛nbBP −
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP ≥ 0
nd
−CP + 
[
˛bBP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
]
−
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP ≥ 0
hat is, if
 ≥ min
(
CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP
˛nbBP
,
CP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
˛bBP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
bP
)
This assumption implies that if settlement fails, the patent holder will never drop the case in Stage 4.
We make another two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the alleged infringer’s payoff if the patent is
nvalidated under the non-bifurcated system is ID = 0.26 This simpliﬁes the analysis by reducing the number of possible
cenarios. In particular, the alleged infringer will always ﬁle an invalidity counterclaim under the non-bifurcated system
in Stage 5) if he does not accept the settlement offer (in Stage 3). Second, we assume that the patent holder’s beneﬁt from
he patent being found infringed and valid (the injunction gap) is equal to the alleged infringer’s loss: BP = LD (respectively,
P = lD).27 This assumption substantially simpliﬁes the mathematical expressions and, therefore, the comparison between
he outcomes under the bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems.
.5.1. Settlement in the non-bifurcated system
Under the non-bifurcated system, the alleged infringer always challenges the patent’s validity in Stage 5 if he turns down
he settlement offer in Stage 3. Let us now consider his decision in Stage 3. He accepts to pay an amount S to settle the
nfringement case if and only if this amount is less than his expected cost from not accepting the settlement offer, i.e.,
S < ˛nbLD + CD
hich is the same as
 > ˆnb (S) ≡ S − CD
˛nbLD
Intuitively, the higher the settlement amount, the lower the probability that the settlement offer is accepted by the
lleged infringer.
Let us now consider the patent holder’s decision in Stage 2. The patent holder knows that a settlement offer involving an
mount S will always be accepted (i.e., will be accepted by all types of defendants) if and only if
S ≤ Snb ≡ ˛nbLD + CD
nd that a settlement offer will always be turned down if and only if
S > S
nb ≡ ˛nbLD + CD
The patent holder also knows that an offer S ∈
(
Snb, S
nb
]
will be accepted by the alleged infringer with probability ( −
ˆnb(S))/( − ) and turned down with probability (ˆnb(S) − )/( − ). In the latter scenario, the patent holder’s probability
f winning (i.e., the probability that the patent is found valid and infringed) is
˛nb
∫ ˆnb(S)

d
ˆnb (S) − 
= ˛
nb
2
(
ˆnb (S) + 
)
˜nb ˜nbThe following lemma  provides the equilibrium settlement amount S and the corresponding probability threshold  =
ˆnb
(
S˜nb
)
above which the settlement offer is accepted.
25 See e.g. the survey by Spier (2007).
26 ID also enters the alleged infringer’s payoffs under the bifurcated system.
27 The assumption BP = LD would hold for instance if the plaintiff’s (defendant’s) only beneﬁt (loss) from the patent being found valid and infringed is the
amages paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The assumption bP = lD would hold for instance if the defendant’s loss from the injunction gap takes the
orm  of license fees paid to the patent holder.
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Lemma  1. The equilibrium settlement amount is given by
S˜nb =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
˛nbLD − CP −
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP if  −  ≥
CD + CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP
˛nbLD
˛nbLD + CD otherwise
(3)
and the equilibrium offer is accepted by an alleged infringer if and only if
 > ˜nb =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 −
CP + CD +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP
˛nbLD
if  −  ≥
CD + CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP
˛nbLD
 otherwise
(4)
Proof. See online Appendix C. 
We  ﬁnd that the equilibrium settlement amount S˜nb is (weakly) increasing in LD, CD and ˛nb and (weakly) decreasing in CP
and LP, which is consistent with the intuition that the settlement amount should increase if the patent holder’s (respectively,
alleged infringer’s) payoff in case settlement fails increases (respectively, decreases).
Note also that S˜nb is always such that a positive fraction of alleged infringers accept the settlement offer. In other words,
in our setup, the plaintiff never ﬁnds it optimal to make a settlement offer that is turned down by all defendant types (which
would the same as not making a settlement offer at all).28
3.5.2. Settlement in the bifurcated system
Under the bifurcated system, it is no longer the case that the alleged infringer always challenges the patent’s validity if
he turns down the settlement offer. Under the assumption ID = 0, he will do so if and only if
cD < 
(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
which can be rewritten as
 > ˇ (cD) ≡
cD(
1 − ˛b
)
(LD − lD)
Therefore, the alleged infringer accepts to pay an amount S to settle the infringement case if and only if
S < min
(
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD + CD + cD, LD + CD
)
which can be rewritten as
 ≥ ˆb (S, cD) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S − CD
LD
if  ≤ ˇ (cD)
S − CD − cD
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
if  > ˇ (cD)
3.5.3. Comparison of the two systems
We investigate here the effect of bifurcation on the (equilibrium) settlement amount and settlement rate, focusing on
the two polar scenarios ˇ (cD) <  and ˇ (cD) ≥ .
Scenario 1: ˇ (c ) <  (or, equivalently, “low” c )D D
In this case, the additional litigation cost an alleged infringer has to incur to ﬁle an invalidity counterclaim never prevents
him from challenging the patent’s validity (when settlement fails). We  can then derive the equilibrium settlement amount
28 Note however that this need not hold if we relax the assumption BP = LD . In particular, Remark 1 in online Appendix C shows that the patent holder
ﬁnds  it optimal to make a settlement offer that is turned down with certainty if
BP > max
(
2LD,
2
˛nb
(
 + 
) [˛nbLD + (1 − ˛nb) LP + CP + CD]
)
.
S
C
a
s
b
w
p
h
A
f
g
w
a
t
s
tK. Cremers et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131 (2016) 218–242 229
˜b and the corresponding probability threshold ˜b = ˆb(S˜b, cD) from the analysis of the non-bifurcated system by replacing
D with CD + cD,
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP with
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP , and ˛nbLD with ˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD:
S˜b =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
)
 − CP −
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP if  −  ≥
CD + CP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
˛bLD + CD otherwise
(5)
nd
˜b =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 −
CP + CD + cD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
if  −  ≥
CD + CP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
 otherwise
(6)
We  can now derive the effects of bifurcation on settlement from the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes under both
ystems. For the sake of exposition, we focus on the set of parameters leading to interior solutions under both systems, i.e.,
 −  ≥
CD + CP + cD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
min
(
˛nbLD, ˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD
)
Effect of bifurcation on the settlement amount: The equilibrium settlement amount under the non-bifurcated system can
e written as
S˜nb = Anb − nbP
here
Anb ≡ ˛nbLD and nbP ≡ CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP
The term Anb measures the extent of adverse selection under the non-bifurcated system: it becomes more costly for the
atent holder to separate defendant types when Anb increases. To see why, notice that the informational rent that a patent
older leaves to defendants that have a type  above the borderline type ˆnb (S) is
(
˛nbLD + CD
)
− S, which is increasing in
nb.
In order to interpret nbP , note ﬁrst that, under the non-bifurcated system, settlement generates joint surplus
nb ≡ CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP + CD
or the patent holder and the alleged infringer. The term nbP is the part of this joint surplus captured by the patent holder,
ross of the settlement amount.
Similarly, we can write the equilibrium settlement amount under the bifurcated system as
S˜b = Ab − bP
here
Ab ≡ ˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD and bP ≡ CP +
(
1 − ˛b
)
LP
re the counterparts of Anb and nbP under the bifurcated system. Denote also
b ≡ CP +
(
1 − ˛nb
)
LP + CD + cD
he counterpart of nb under the bifurcated system (when the alleged infringer ﬁles an invalidity couterclaim whenever
ettlement fails, as in the current scenario).
Thus,
S˜b − S˜nb =
(
Ab − Anb
)
 −
(
bP − nbP
)
(7)
This shows that the comparison of the equilibrium settlement amounts under the two systems depends on the following
wo effects:
a. The effect of bifurcation on the extent of adverse selection, which is captured by Ab − Anb . An increase (decrease) in the
extent of adverse selection has a positive (negative) effect on the settlement amount. The intuition behind this is that
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more adverse selection provides the patent holder with larger incentives to limit the informational rent left to the alleged
infringer types that accept to settle by increasing the settlement amount that he requests.
b. The effect of bifurcation on the part of the joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder (gross of the
settlement amount). Note that the sign of this effect is always positive:
bP − nbP =
(
˛nb − ˛b
)
LP ≥ 0
because the probability that the patent is invalidated when challenged is higher under the bifurcated system. This means
that, for a given settlement amount, the patent holder’s part of the surplus from settlement under the bifurcated system
is greater than its counterpart under the non-bifurcated system. This effect of bifurcation increases the patent holder’s
incentives to make a less demanding offer in order to increase the probability of reaching a settlement.
Therefore, we need to distinguish between two cases:
1 If Ab ≤ Anb then both effects lead to a decrease of the settlement amount and, therefore, the overall effect of bifurcation on
the settlement amount is negative.
2 If Ab > Anb then the effect of bifurcation on adverse selection affects positively the settlement amount while the effect of
bifurcation on the part of the joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder affects negatively the settlement
amount. Therefore, the overall effect of bifurcation is ambiguous in this case.
Effect of bifurcation on the settlement rate: Denote r˜b ≡ −˜b
−
the equilibrium settlement rate under the bifurcated system
and r˜nb ≡ −˜nb
−
its counterpart under the non-bifurcated system. From (4) and (6) it follows that
r˜nb = 1
 − 
nb
Anb
and
r˜b = 1
 − 
b
Ab
Therefore,
r˜b
r˜nb
= 
b/nb
Ab/Anb
(8)
Thus, the effect of bifurcation on the settlement rate depends on its effect on the joint surplus from settlement (how
b/nb compares to 1) and its effect on the extent of adverse selection (i.e., how Ab/Anb compares to 1).
Note ﬁrst that the joint surplus generated by a settlement is always greater under the bifurcated system than under the
non-bifurcated system:
b
nb
− 1 = 
b − nb
nb
=
(
˛nb − ˛b
)
LP + cD
nb
≥ 0
The reason for this is that bifurcation induces a higher expected loss from invalidation for the patent holder and higher
litigation costs for the alleged infringer. This increase in the joint surplus from settlement increases the parties’ incentives
to settle, which explains why it has a positive effect on the settlement rate.
Consider now the effect of adverse selection on the settlement rate. As discussed before, an increase in the latter provides
the patent holder with incentives to increase the amount requested in the settlement offer. This leads to a lower settlement
rate, and is consistent with the idea that an increase in adverse selection has generally a negative impact on efﬁciency.29
This is why an increase (decrease) in adverse selection due to bifurcation, i.e. A
b
> 1 ( A
b
< 1) has a negative (positive)
Anb Anb
effect on the ratio of settlement rates r˜
b
r˜nb
.
From the discussion above it follows that we need to distinguish again between the same two cases as before:
29 In our context, reaching a settlement is an efﬁcient outcome and an increase in the extent of adverse selection leads to a decrease in the probability of
this  event.
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 If Ab ≤ Anb then bifurcation has a positive effect on the settlement rate: it increases the joint surplus from settlement and
decreases the extent of adverse selection.
 If Ab > Anb then bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on the settlement rate: it increases the joint surplus from settlement
but also increases the extent of adverse selection.
Scenario 2: ˇ (cD) ≥  (or, equivalently, “high” cD)
In this (other polar) simple scenario, the patent’s validity is never challenged if the settlement attempt fails. We can
herefore derive the equilibrium settlement amount S˜b and the corresponding probability threshold ˜b from the analysis of
he non-bifurcated system by replacing ˛nb with 1 in (3) and (4):
S˜b =
⎧⎨
⎩ LD − CP if  −  ≥
CD + CP
LD
LD + CD otherwise
nd
˜b =
⎧⎨
⎩  −
CP + CD
LD
if  −  ≥ CD + CP
LD
 otherwise
For the sake of exposition, let us focus again on the set of parameters leading to interior solutions under both systems.
In the current scenario, the extent of adverse selection under the bifurcated system is
Ab = LD
nd the joint surplus from settlement and the part of this surplus captured by the patent holder (gross of the settlement
mount) are respectively given by
b = CP + CD
nd
bP = CP
Comparing these with their counterparts under the non-bifurcated system shows that, in this scenario, bifurcation
ncreases the extent of adverse selection (Ab ≥ Anb), decreases the joint surplus from settlement (b ≤ nb), and decreases
he part of the joint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder (bP ≤ nbP ). Then, from (7) and (8) it follows
hat bifurcation leads unambiguously to an increase in the equilibrium settlement amount (S˜b ≥ S˜nb) and a decrease in
he settlement rate (r˜b ≤ r˜nb). The reason for this ﬁnding is the same as in Scenario 1 (and so is the associated intuition):
he settlement amount is positively affected by the extent of adverse selection and negatively affected by the part of the
oint surplus from settlement captured by the patent holder (gross of the settlement amount), while the settlement rate is
ositively affected by the joint surplus from settlement and negatively affected by the extent of adverse selection.
The next proposition summarizes the results derived under the two scenarios considered above.
roposition 3.
. If the additional cost of ﬁling a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is sufﬁciently low (ˇ (cD) < ) and bifurcation
decreases the extent of adverse selection (˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD ≤ ˛nbLD) then bifurcation has a negative effect on the settlement
amount and a positive effect on the settlement rate.
. If the additional cost of ﬁling a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is sufﬁciently low (ˇ (cD) < ), and bifurcation
increases the extent of adverse selection (˛bLD +
(
1 − ˛b
)
lD > ˛nbLD) then bifurcation has an ambiguous effect on both the
settlement amount and the settlement rate.
. If the additional cost of ﬁling a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is sufﬁciently high (ˇ (cD) ≥ ) then bifurcation
has a positive effect on the settlement amount and a negative effect on the settlement rate.
This proposition provides testable predictions and shows that the magnitude of the additional cost of ﬁling a validity
hallenge under the bifurcated system can be (qualitatively) inferred from empirical ﬁndings about the effect of bifurcation
n the settlement rate..6. Extension: timing
In another extension, presented in online Appendix D, we consider a variant of our setting in which the timeline and, in
articular, the injunction gap are explicitly modeled. We  model the time that elapses between the actions of the following
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(strategic and non-strategic) players: the court(s), the patent holder, the alleged infringer and a third ﬁrm that considers
entering the market before the patent expires (but will only do so if the patent is invalidated).
If the court ﬁnds that the patent is valid and infringed, it makes the infringer pay damages to the patent holder. We
suppose that these damages are equal to the loss incurred by the patent holder because the alleged infringer was active in
the output market. Moreover, when the court ﬁnds the patent to be valid and infringed, it imposes an injunction against the
alleged infringer who has then to stay out of the market until the patent expires.
Under the bifurcated system, if the patent is found invalid after being found infringed, the infringer can re-enter the
market right after the invalidity decision. Moreover, he can recover the damages he had to pay to the patent holder after the
judgment regarding the infringement issue, and can claim for compensation for the fact that he wrongly faced an injunction
between the two court judgments. To capture the loss (beneﬁt) that the injunction gap induces for the alleged infringer
(patent holder) we assume that the alleged infringer is not fully compensated for the loss incurred between the two court
judgments.
We show in online Appendix D that the patent holder’s and alleged infringer’s payoffs in this model are a special case
of the reduced-form payoffs in our baseline model. On the one hand, this shows that all the results we  derived in our basic
setting carry over to this extension, and, on the other hand, it provides micro-foundations for the reduced-form payoffs of
the baseline model.
4. Data
The focus of our empirical analysis is on the German bifurcated litigation system. However, our comparison of the
bifurcated with the non-bifurcated system also relies on U.K. litigation data. In this section we  discuss our data for both
jurisdictions.
4.1. Data sources
Germany: regional courts – infringement
We  collected data on infringement actions directly from the three regional courts that deal with the majority of patent
infringement cases in Germany: the Regional Courts of Düsseldorf, Mannheim, and Munich I. We  obtained detailed informa-
tion on proceedings ﬁled during the time period 2000–2008. This provides us with a nine-year window but also minimizes
the number of cases that were still pending during the data collection.30
The information extracted for each case concerns procedural aspects, the identity of the litigants and their legal represent-
atives, and the patents at issue. The data include information on the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and defendants,
which allowed us to match corporate litigants to ﬁrm-level databases, including Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS, Compustat and
THOMSON One.
With the patent application (or publication) numbers referenced in the case ﬁles, we retrieved detailed information on
the litigated patents from EPO’s Patstat.31 Patstat provides us with detailed information on patent characteristics, such as
application and publication dates, patent classes, etc. On basis of the patent numbers we  constructed the respective patent
families to obtain other European national as well as EP equivalents in order to identify cases where a particular patent
dispute spreads across multiple national jurisdictions.
Germany: Federal Patent Court – invalidity
We also have information on invalidity proceedings before the BPatG and its appeal court, the BGH. Both courts publish
all decisions on validity since 2000 on their websites. We  also obtained information on the ﬁling date as well as withdrawn
actions in both instances from the register of the German Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce. This allowed us to construct the
course of the invalidity proceedings without having to access the case ﬁles at the courts.U.K.: PHC and PCC/IPEC – infringement and invalidity
For the U.K., we have detailed data on the population of cases at the PHC, and the PCC/IPEC. Data for the PHC are available
for the period 2000–2013, whereas no IPEC court records are available for cases ﬁled prior to 2007.32 The PHC and IPEC data
30 Data collection started in Mannheim in spring 2010, in Munich in December 2010 and in Düsseldorf in December 2011. On average seven junior lawyers
(Referendare)  were employed as research assistants at each court to record the data directly from the dockets. Most research assistants had already passed
the  qualifying examination that authorizes them to practice law in Germany. They also received speciﬁc training for the data collection. Because case ﬁles
are  stored at the courts only in paper format, our research assistants had to digitize the relevant information directly at the regional courts. To retrieve all
information in a systematic manner, we created a common data template. To address potential problems originating from pending cases, we revisited the
court  records at the Regional Court Düsseldorf in June 2013. In addition, over the past few years, German courts have increasingly made decisions available
online. We  repeatedly screened the online case repositories and complemented our records where possible. As a result, there are only 33 cases (<1%) in
our  dataset where the ﬁrst instance infringement decision is still unknown to us and which we  therefore drop from our sample.
31 We use the Patstat version October 2015.
32 Estimates based on anonymized data for 2005/06 suggest that cases at the PCC accounted for only around 20% of all patent cases in the U.K. during the
2000–2006 period (Cremers et al., 2016). Also, case counts at the PCC were very low in absolute terms compared to the period 2007–2013 for which we
have  data.
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or the period 2007–2013 were collected directly from physical PHC and IPEC court records/ﬁles in 2014 and 2015.33 The PHC
ata for the earlier 2000–2006 period were collected from a range of online sources.34 The U.K. court records contain detailed
nformation on both infringement claims and invalidity counterclaims, as well as case outcomes. As for the German data,
e matched the names of the parties involved to ﬁrm-level databases (Bureau van Dijk’s FAME, Amadeus, and Compustat)
nd retrieved detailed information from Patstat on the litigated patents.
PO and DPMA – opposition
We have data on any prior or parallel opposition of the patents involved in an infringement action. For DE patents we
ave information on the opposition proceeding, i.e. the opposition’s ﬁling and end dates as well as outcome, from the register
f the DPMA. We  constructed data on oppositions at the EPO based on legal status information from Patstat covering 1981
o 2012. In contrast to the data from the DPMA, the data for oppositions at the EPO have information on the identity of the
pponent, that is, the party ﬁling the opposition. We  added information on any opposition to the patents involved in an
nfringement proceeding to identify parallel invalidity proceedings in form of oppositions and to construct each patent’s
istory of validity challenges.
.2. Sample description
ermany
The patent litigation actions collected at the Regional Courts of Mannheim, Düsseldorf, and Munich cover around 90%
f all patent infringement cases during the period 2000–2008.35 We  drop cases from our dataset that involve a patent, but
hat are not directly concerned with infringement.36 We  also drop cases involving utility models because the bifurcation
rinciple only applies to invention patents. Furthermore, to avoid misinterpretation of case outcomes, we  also remove a
mall number of negative declaratory actions and cases where the court decides only on issues regarding the enforcement of
 previous judgment (e.g. the amount of damages granted). The resulting sample contains 3279 patent infringement cases.
s some actions are ﬁled on the basis of more than one patent, our sample contains 3600 patent-case observations.37
For the time period 2000 to 2008 our data count 1822 invalidity actions ﬁled at the Federal Patent Court.38
.K.
For the U.K., our data cover the population of patent cases between 2007 and 2013. For 2000–2006 we estimate that our
ata contain around 80% of disputes. As in the German data, we drop cases that are not directly concerned with infringement
s well as those on negative declaratory actions. We  also drop cases that are withdrawn or settled within 90 days counting
rom the ﬁling date of the claim form as these cases are not relevant for our analysis.39 The resulting sample contains 299
atent infringement cases involving 377 different patents. As several actions are ﬁled on the basis of more than one patent,
ur sample contains 461 patent-case observations.
. Effects of bifurcation
In this section, we ﬁrst provide empirical evidence on the injunction gap in the bifurcated litigation system. We then
nalyze the likelihood of invalidity challenges and settlements in the bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems..1. Divergent decisions
We  begin by assessing the frequency of cases where a patent was  ‘invalid but infringed’ in the German litigation system.
uch decisions are only possible in systems that separate infringement and validity proceedings and depend on the temporal
33 The data collection and assembly is described in detail in Helmers et al. (2015).
34 To ensure completeness of our records, we  relied on the Court Diary which lists all cases scheduled for a hearing or application, including a case
anagement conference which is usually the ﬁrst step in the litigation process. The data collection is described in detail in Helmers and McDonagh (2012).
35 We estimate that roughly half of the remaining 10% of cases are spread over the other nine regional courts. However, these courts are of minor
mportance and reputation. The possibility to choose a litigation venue might create incentives for forum shopping (Gaessler, 2016). In our setting forum
hopping might compound the effects of bifurcation, although it is unclear how important such an effect might be given the strong concentration of
itigation activity in only three regional courts.
36 This includes employee invention disputes, licensing and patent transfer disputes, as well as patent arrogations and false marking.
37 For the empirical analysis in Section 5.2, we  further exclude cases that end with a judgment in the ﬁrst 120 days because they represent decisions on
reliminary injunctions without a subsequent main proceeding. Since our focus lies on invalidity actions as a response to an infringement allegation, we
lso  exclude cases with a pending opposition proceeding throughout the whole infringement case. For the empirical analysis in Section 5.3, the sample is
urther  reduced by excluding cases that end in settlement after a validity challenge to remain consistent with our theoretical model.
38 As parallel invalidity proceedings may  be ﬁled either before or after this time frame, we  identiﬁed all invalidity actions ﬁled against patents involved
n  an infringement proceeding and added these to our data. For more details and a breakdown of court cases by court see Cremers et al. (2016).
39 These are generally cases where the defendant did not even ﬁle an initial defense, i.e. the only action that occurred is the ﬁling of the claim form. This
sually happens when a defendant does not respond at all to the case, the plaintiff simply drops the case, or the parties settle immediately after the ﬁling
f  the claim form.
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Table 1
Comparing outcomes of infringement and invalidity proceedings where infringement was  decided ﬁrst.
Notes: Dark gray-shaded area shows clear divergent decisions. Light gray-shaded area shows presumed divergent decisions. The sample consists of all
infringement proceedings with a parallel invalidity proceeding and where the ﬁrst instance infringement outcome is ﬁrst. In case of multiple invalidity
decisions, the fastest decision is chosen. The unit of observation is at the patent in the infringement proceedings.
spread between infringement and validity challenges. Fig. A-3 in the online appendix shows that in most cases the invalidity
action followed its corresponding infringement action. As invalidity proceedings take on average longer, too (see Fig. A-4 in
the online appendix), the infringement decision is usually handed down ﬁrst, despite the possibility to have the infringement
proceeding stayed. The (ﬁrst instance) decision on validity is taken on average 6.8 months after the (ﬁrst instance) decision
on infringement. This shows that there is substantial scope for an injunction gap: if a patent is found to be infringed, the
patent holder has on average 6.8 months to enforce the patent even if the patent is invalidated once the BPatG (invalidity)
or DPMA and EPO (opposition) hand down their decision.
Table 1 cross-tabulates the (ﬁrst instance) infringement and invalidity outcomes for all 1248 parallel cases where the
decision on infringement was handed down ﬁrst. The gray-shaded cells in Table 1 show that there is a sizeable number
of cases where the patent was ﬁrst found to be infringed and later invalidated by the BPatG or the DPMA/EPO. If we also
consider cases where the patent was partly invalidated or infringed, there is a total of 145 cases. For comparison, in only
69 cases patents that were found to be (partly) infringed were upheld in the invalidity proceeding. This means that slightly
more than 11.6% of cases (including cases that settled) produce divergent decisions – the patent is ﬁrst found to be infringed
but later invalidated.40 If we focus on cases with a decision in both venues, the share increases to 41.3%.
Fig. 2 shows the length of the injunction gap for the 145 cases with divergent decisions. The ﬁgure distinguishes between
invalidity decisions through the opposition divisions of the DPMA/EPO and the BPatG. The median injunction gap for cases
in which the infringed patent was eventually invalidated by the BPatG is about 14 months. Hence, parties that have won the
infringement case have little over a year to enforce a patent that should not have been granted in the ﬁrst place.41 The length
of the injunction gap is signiﬁcantly longer for cases in which the patent was  invalidated through opposition procedures.
The median is 34 months. As shown in Fig. 2, the main reason for this is that there are a considerable number of opposition
proceedings that take a lot longer to reach a ﬁnal decision than invalidity proceedings at the BPatG.
As explained in Section 2, the judgment by the infringement court is (preliminarily) enforceable despite a pending decision
on validity. The only way to prevent an injunction from taking binding effect is to appeal the judgment. In fact, we  observe
an appeal rate of 57.9% for cases with a parallel invalidity proceeding compared to 26.2% for cases with no parallel invalidity
proceeding.42 An assessment of ﬁnal outcomes of cases with divergent decisions (Table A-2 in the online appendix) reveals
that in 42.8% of cases with divergent decisions in ﬁrst instance, the divergent decision is upheld upon appeal.
Table 2 shows a comparison of case-, litigant-, and patent-level characteristics between defendants in infringement cases
that were subject to divergent decisions and all other cases with ‘non-divergent’ outcomes. The litigation value does not
differ signiﬁcantly between divergent and non-divergent decisions, that is, there is no evidence for disproportionately many
low-value cases ending up in an injunction gap. That said, we  ﬁnd that validity challenges in cases with divergent decisions
are ﬁled on average three months later than in cases with non-divergent decisions. This shows that the temporal separation
of infringement and invalidity proceedings contributes to divergent outcomes. When we  look at the size of the defendants
in the infringement cases in the two groups, we  ﬁnd slightly more small ﬁrms in the divergent decision group on the one
hand, and more large ﬁrms in the non-divergent decision group on the other.
40 Fig. A-5 in the online appendix shows the occurrence of divergent decisions over time.
41 Considering that appellate invalidity proceedings take several years, the actual injunction gap until the decision on the patent’s invalidity is binding
may  be considerably longer.
42 This hints at the possibility that the appeal rate is higher in a bifurcated system than in a non-bifurcated system. An appeal to an infringement decision
may  be useful – regardless of its prospects of success – in order to delay an injunction while the decision on validity is still pending.
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Fig. 2. Length of injunction gap for divergent decisions. Notes: The ﬁgure shows all divergent decisions regardless of whether parties have (preliminarily)
enforced the infringement judgment.
Table 2
Comparison of alleged infringers by decision.
Variables Decision type SE mean diff. Signif.
Non-divergent Divergent
Mean Mean
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.11 0.12 0.028
Small 0.15 0.23 0.032 **
Medium 0.21 0.27 0.037
Large 0.52 0.39 0.044 ***
Germany 0.82 0.88 0.033 *
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.13 0.10 0.029
World (excl. Europe) 0.05 0.02 0.019 *
Top legal representative 0.55 0.61 0.044
Proceeding
Litigation value (in D ) 1133.44 986.43 229.887
Lag  of invalidity action (in months) 4.14 6.57 0.916 ***
Lag of opposition (in months) −6.70 −6.53 1.535
Technological area
Electrical engineering 0.30 0.14 0.039 ***
Instruments 0.12 0.20 0.029 ***
Chemistry 0.15 0.23 0.033 **
Mechanical engineering 0.29 0.30 0.040
Other 0.14 0.13 0.031
Observations 1102 145
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with parallel invalidity proceedings or oppositions regardless of the timing of the decisions.
The  unit of observation is at the patent in each infringement proceeding.
*
5
T
p
ap < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
.2. Validity challenges
About 37.8% of infringement cases (counted at the patent-level) in Germany are associated with an invalidity action.
his ﬁgure is low compared to litigation systems where infringement and invalidity are decided simultaneously in the same
roceeding. In fact, in the U.K. we ﬁnd counterclaims for invalidity in 71.6% of infringement cases. Table A-4 in the online
ppendix shows the share of infringement cases where validity was  challenged and breaks it down by technology area of
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Table 3
Probit model results: incidence of invalidity action (DE).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.066 (0.044) 0.042 (0.045) 0.038 (0.045) 0.036 (0.045)
Medium (d) 0.101** (0.040) 0.080* (0.041) 0.077* (0.042) 0.075* (0.042)
Large  (d) 0.167*** (0.037) 0.134*** (0.039) 0.131*** (0.039) 0.110*** (0.040)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.100*** (0.026) −0.094*** (0.026) −0.083*** (0.027)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.223*** (0.040) −0.227*** (0.039) −0.207*** (0.041)
Number of parties −0.004 (0.021)
Multinational group (d) 0.106*** (0.037)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.148*** (0.022)
Patent  holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.043 (0.038) −0.035 (0.038) −0.029 (0.039)
Small  (d) −0.011 (0.049) −0.009 (0.049) −0.013 (0.050)
Medium (d) −0.033 (0.046) −0.021 (0.047) −0.023 (0.047)
Large  (d) −0.009 (0.044) −0.002 (0.044) −0.015 (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.032 (0.028) 0.040 (0.028) 0.026 (0.028)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.060* (0.035) −0.056 (0.035) −0.056 (0.035)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.006 (0.028)
Invalidity history
Patent solidiﬁed (opp. proc.) (d) 0.051* (0.029) 0.039 (0.030)
Patent  challenged (rev. proc.) (d) −0.146*** (0.039) −0.129*** (0.041)
Patent  solidiﬁed (rev. proc.) (d) −0.022 (0.080) −0.040 (0.081)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) −0.231*** (0.033) −0.231*** (0.033) −0.243*** (0.032)
Litigation value (in D , log) 0.046*** (0.011) 0.044*** (0.011) 0.039*** (0.011)
Multi-jurisdictional litigation (d) 0.091 (0.062)
Controls
Year  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.079 0.079 0.099
Observations 2529 2529 2529 2529
Marginal effects reported; case-clustered standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment/settlement during the ﬁrst 120 days counting from the ﬁling date of the
case.  The dependent variable is equal to one if the defendant challenged validity in parallel proceedings at the BPatG. The unit of observation is at the
patent-case-level. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: Germany. Patent characteristics not reported in the table include patent age
(in  years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in ﬁrst 3 years), number of International Patent
Classiﬁcation (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and
accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical
engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each regional court.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
the patent in question. The rate of validity challenges is consistently nearly twice as large in the U.K. as it is in Germany
across all technology areas.
The model in Section 3 suggested that in a bifurcated system alleged infringers are less likely to challenge validity due
to the possibility of an injunction gap and the additional cost of initiating and conducting separate invalidity proceedings.
To test Prediction 1 empirically, we compare directly the propensity that an alleged infringer ﬁles an invalidity action in
Germany vs. the U.K. The model also predicted that in a bifurcated system, in particular more resource-constrained ﬁrms are
less likely to contest validity. To test Prediction 2, we  distinguish between four size categories: micro, small, medium and
large.43 We  ask whether micro-sized corporate and individual defendants are less likely to challenge validity at the BPatG
and compare this with the U.K. We  estimate the following discrete choice speciﬁcation:∑ ∑ ∑invalpit = ˛0 + ˇukpit +
s
ssizeit +
s
ıs[sizeit × ukpit] + Xpit +
t
tDt + pit (9)
43 The size categories are deﬁned according to the EU deﬁnition, which relies on information on a ﬁrm’s number of employees, turnover, and total assets.
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Table  4
Probit model results: incidence of validity challenges (DE-U.K. comparison).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DE only U.K. only DE+U.K. DE+U.K.
Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge Validity challenge
Jurisdiction
UK (d) 0.581*** (0.046) 0.551*** (0.082)
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.035 (0.044) −0.164 (0.138) 0.026 (0.042) 0.036 (0.045)
Medium (d) 0.078* (0.041) 0.010 (0.102) 0.073* (0.040) 0.081* (0.042)
Large  (d) 0.116*** (0.039) −0.027 (0.078) 0.116*** (0.037) 0.121*** (0.040)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) −0.099*** (0.026) 0.178*** (0.041) −0.091*** (0.027) −0.099*** (0.027)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.209*** (0.041) −0.468** (0.196) −0.251*** (0.039) −0.227*** (0.046)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.157*** (0.022) 0.003 (0.061) 0.148*** (0.022) 0.150*** (0.022)
Alleged infringer × U.K.
Small (d) −0.205** (0.098)
Medium (d) −0.015 (0.152)
Large  (d) −0.079 (0.106)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) 0.350** (0.158)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.206* (0.117)
Patent  holder
Non-practicing entity (d) −0.031 (0.038) −0.178 (0.109) −0.029 (0.037) −0.048 (0.038)
Small  (d) −0.014 (0.049) 0.041 (0.094) 0.019 (0.048) −0.013 (0.050)
Medium (d) −0.034 (0.046) 0.149*** (0.057) −0.004 (0.045) −0.041 (0.047)
Large  (d) −0.016 (0.044) 0.334*** (0.119) 0.013 (0.041) −0.020 (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.025 (0.028) −0.257** (0.102) 0.014 (0.027) 0.033 (0.029)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.049 (0.035) 0.063 (0.079) −0.024 (0.034) −0.042 (0.036)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.005 (0.028) −0.222*** (0.074) −0.016 (0.027) −0.014 (0.028)
Patent  holder × U.K.
Small (d) 0.219 (0.170)
Medium (d) 0.375*** (0.132)
Large  (d) 0.285** (0.118)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) −0.264*** (0.061)
World (excl. Europe) (d) 0.098 (0.125)
Invalidity history
Patent solidiﬁed (opp. proc.) (d) 0.041 (0.029) 0.046 (0.085) 0.053* (0.030) 0.055* (0.030)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) −0.231*** (0.034) 0.137*** (0.048) −0.170*** (0.036) −0.175*** (0.037)
Litigation value (in D , log) 0.042*** (0.011) −0.005 (0.031) 0.037*** (0.010) 0.040*** (0.011)
Controls
Year  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent  characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.391 0.123 0.131
Observations 2529 461 2990 2990
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parentheses;
(d)  for discrete change of dummy  variable from 0 to 1.
Notes: The DE (U.K.) sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement/judgment during the ﬁrst 120 (90) days counting from the ﬁling
date  of the case. The dependent variable is equal to one if the defendant challenged validity – DE: in parallel proceedings at the BPatG – U.K.: through an
invalidity counterclaim in the same proceedings. The unit of observation is at the patent-case-level. U.K. cases with multiple patents are weighted to account
for  oversampling. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: domestic (Germany/U.K.). Patent characteristics not reported in the table include
patent age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in ﬁrst 3 years), number of International
Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and
accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical
engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each German and U.K. court.
* p < 0.10.
**
w
d
d
i
ap < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
here invalpit is a dummy  variable that is equal to one if the alleged infringer i challenged validity of patent p in year t. ukpit
enotes a dummy  variable that is equal to one if a case was  litigated in the U.K., sizeit are three dummy  variables for the
ifferent company size categories (small, medium, and large) where the omitted category is micro-sized ﬁrms. sizeit × ukpit
s the interaction of size categories and the U.K. dummy  variable. The speciﬁcation includes a number of patent-, case-,
nd litigant-characteristics among the regressors Xpit (for a detailed deﬁnition of these variables see online Appendix E).
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The regressions also include year, patent technology class, and court dummies. We  estimate the speciﬁcation in (9) using a
probit model and cluster standard errors at the case-level. Summary statistics are shown in Table A-3 in the online appendix.
Table 3 shows the results when we focus on patent cases in Germany. As we  move from left (column 1) to right (column
4), we add additional variables at the defendant-, plaintiff-, patent-, and case-level. All speciﬁcations include year and
technology effects and a number of patent characteristics. The results for our preferred speciﬁcation in column 4 show
that medium-sized and large ﬁrms are about 7% and 11% respectively more likely to ﬁle an invalidity action at the BPatG
than micro-sized alleged infringers. This suggests that smaller defendants in infringement proceedings are less likely to
challenge the validity of the patent at issue. In contrast, there is no evidence that the size of the plaintiff in the infringement
proceedings, that is the patent holder, plays any role in the decision to challenge the patent’s validity. This supports the view
(and Prediction 2 of our model) that the decision not to ﬁle a parallel action at the BPatG is at least partly determined by
resource constraints on the alleged infringer’s side.
Next, we turn to our cross-jurisdictional comparison of the incidence of a separate invalidity action at the BPatG in
Germany with that of an invalidity counterclaim in the U.K. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the results for Germany
and the U.K. individually (the speciﬁcation differs slightly form that used in Table 3 because a number of variables are not
available in the U.K. dataset).44 The estimates for the U.K. shown in Column 2 indicate that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
difference in the propensity to challenge validity through a counterclaim across ﬁrms in the different size groups in the
U.K. Micro-sized companies are no less likely to challenge validity than ﬁrms in any of the other three size categories (see
also Table A-4 in the online appendix for descriptive evidence). In columns 3 and 4 we pool the German and U.K. data to
estimate speciﬁcation (9). First, the U.K. dummy  variable is statistically highly signiﬁcant, positive, and large in magnitude.
This clearly indicates that alleged infringers are more likely (around 55%) to challenge validity in infringement proceedings
in the non-bifurcated relative to the bifurcated system. This conﬁrms Prediction 1 of our theoretical model. Moreover, when
we look at the interaction of the U.K. dummy  with the ﬁrm-size dummies, we  see that the signs are all negative and in case
of the small company size category even statistically signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings from column 2 that micro-sized
companies are not less likely to challenge validity in the U.K. as opposed to the German bifurcated system adding further
evidence in support of Prediction 2.
The results in Tables 3 and 4, therefore, provide strong evidence in favor of a ‘validity-challenge deterrence’ effect of
bifurcation as suggested by our model. Alleged infringers are generally less likely to challenge validity in the bifurcated
system compared to the non-bifurcated system. Moreover, more resource-constrained ﬁrms are less likely to ﬁle an invalidity
action in response to an infringement claim in the bifurcated system. This also implies that the 11.6% of ‘invalid but infringed’
cases shown in Section 5.1 in the German system are downward biased. Fewer patents are in fact invalidated than in the
absence of the additional costs engendered by bifurcation. This also contributes to the strong presumption of validity in a
litigation system where infringement is decided ﬁrst in a self-reinforcing way.
5.3. Settlement
The extension of our model looked at the impact of bifurcation on settlement amounts and rates. Settlement amounts
are private information and usually not disclosed in court records. Hence we focus on the incidence of settlements, which
observe in our data. The model in Section 3.5 produced ambiguous predictions regarding the propensity to settle in a
bifurcated system compared to the non-bifurcated system (Proposition 3). Hence, we rely on the data to reveal which one
of the different effects of bifurcation dominates. To do this, we again compare directly the outcomes of infringement cases
in Germany with the U.K. We  also test for differences in settlement behavior across ﬁrm-size groups because our model
suggests that the additional costs involved in a validity challenge in the bifurcated system are one of the determinants of
settlements. Hence, we estimate the analogue to speciﬁcation (9):
settlepit = ˛0 + ˇukpit +
∑
s
ssizeit +
∑
s
ıs[sizeit × ukpit] + Xpit +
∑
t
tDt + pit (10)
where settlepit is a dummy  variable that is equal to one if the case was  settled. Note that our sample of cases has changed
compared to speciﬁcation (9), because we drop all cases that settled after an invalidity action was  ﬁled. Following the structure
of our theoretical model, we are interested in the incidence of settlement before the defendant decides to challenge validity.
All other variables remain unaltered compared to speciﬁcation (9). We  also estimate the speciﬁcation in (10) using a probit
model and cluster standard errors at the case-level. Summary statistics are shown in Table A-3 in the online appendix.
Table 5 shows the results for Germany. The estimates show that all marginal effects for the set of size dummies are positive
and statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero in the case of medium-sized and large ﬁrms, although in the latter case only
marginally so in column 4. This indicates that smaller companies are less likely to settle compared to larger companies.
Turning to the comparison between Germany and the U.K. in Table 6, we ﬁnd ﬁrst of all in columns 3 and 4 a statistically
highly signiﬁcant and negative marginal effect for the U.K. dummy  variable, which means that parties have a lower propensity
to settle in the U.K. This empirical ﬁnding is in line with the theoretical predictions derived under Scenario 1 (i.e. “low” cD)
44 Alternative speciﬁcations for the U.K. can be found in Table A-5 in the online appendix.
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Table  5
Probit model results: incidence of settlement (DE).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Case settled Case settled Case settled Case settled
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.039 (0.047) 0.056 (0.048) 0.057 (0.048) 0.052 (0.048)
Medium (d) 0.089* (0.043) 0.117** (0.045) 0.116** (0.045) 0.117** (0.045)
Large  (d) 0.028 (0.040) 0.073 (0.043) 0.072 (0.044) 0.088* (0.044)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.208*** (0.031) 0.205*** (0.031) 0.195*** (0.032)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) 0.051 (0.057) 0.056 (0.058) 0.021 (0.058)
Number of parties −0.047 (0.033)
Multinational group (d) −0.098* (0.045)
Top  legal representative (d) −0.145*** (0.025)
Patent  holder
Non-practicing entity (d) 0.108* (0.048) 0.105* (0.048) 0.087 (0.048)
Small  (d) 0.117* (0.059) 0.116* (0.059) 0.105 (0.059)
Medium (d) 0.061 (0.057) 0.055 (0.057) 0.050 (0.057)
Large  (d) 0.068 (0.052) 0.065 (0.052) 0.063 (0.051)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.035 (0.032) 0.030 (0.032) 0.042 (0.033)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) 0.120** (0.039) 0.118** (0.040) 0.110** (0.040)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.027 (0.033)
Invalidity history
Patent solidiﬁed (opp. proc.) (d) −0.032 (0.034) −0.013 (0.035)
Patent  challenged (rev. proc.) (d) 0.055 (0.060) 0.045 (0.059)
Patent  solidiﬁed (rev. proc.) (d) 0.031 (0.092) 0.043 (0.093)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) 0.240*** (0.054) 0.238*** (0.055) 0.247*** (0.056)
Litigation value (in D , log) −0.026* (0.012) −0.026* (0.012) −0.022 (0.012)
Multi-jurisdictional litigation (d) 0.095 (0.072)
Controls
Year  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court  effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent  characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo  R2 0.067 0.104 0.106 0.122
Observations 2020 2020 2020 2020
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parentheses;
(d)  for discrete change of dummy  variable from 0 to 1
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment during the ﬁrst 120 days or settlement after the ﬁling of an invalidity action.
The  dependent variable is equal to one if the case settled. The unit of observation is at the patent-case level. Cases with multiple patents are weighted
to  account for oversampling. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: Germany. Patent characteristics not reported in the table include
patent age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in ﬁrst 3 years), number of number of
International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP
patents, and accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry,
mechanical engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each regional court.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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ind is inconsistent with those derived under Scenario 2 (i.e. “high” cD). The fact that our empirical analysis rejects Scenario
 is not surprising since, in that scenario, the additional cost of ﬁling a validity challenge under the bifurcated system is
ufﬁciently high for all validity challenges to be deterred, which is not consistent with our data.
When we look at the marginal effects of the size dummies for the U.K. sample in column 2, we ﬁnd that the marginal
ffects of none of the size dummies are remotely statistically signiﬁcant (for more results for the U.K. sample see Table A-6
n the online appendix). That is, there is no evidence that settlement behavior differs in the U.K. across ﬁrms of different
ize which corroborates our ﬁndings from our analysis of the incidence of invalidity challenges: the additional cost of ﬁling
n invalidity action is less important in the U.K. and hence does not affect smaller ﬁrms disproportionately more. When we
ook at the pooled sample in columns 3 and 4, the marginal effects of the U.K.-size interaction terms for the alleged infringer
re not statistically signiﬁcant while the medium and large ﬁrm size dummies on their own still are signiﬁcant. Hence, we
ee that in the U.K. (a) infringement cases are less likely to settle than in Germany and (b) smaller ﬁrms are equally likely to
ettle as larger ﬁrms while in Germany smaller ﬁrms are less likely to settle. These two  ﬁndings in combination imply that
he pattern of settlement rates in Germany can at least partly be attributed to the additional cost of ﬁling a validity challenge
n the bifurcated system.
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Table 6
Probit model results: incidence of settlement (DE-U.K. comparison).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DE only U.K. only DE + U.K. DE + U.K.
Case  settled Case settled Case settled Case settled
Jurisdiction
U.K. (d) −0.391*** (0.049) −0.303*** (0.116)
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.051 (0.048) 0.251 (0.179) 0.048 (0.046) 0.053 (0.047)
Medium (d) 0.118*** (0.045) 0.226 (0.209) 0.107** (0.043) 0.115*** (0.044)
Large  (d) 0.079* (0.044) -0.011 (0.107) 0.054 (0.042) 0.078* (0.043)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.209*** (0.031) −0.179** (0.082) 0.185*** (0.031) 0.201*** (0.031)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) 0.038 (0.058) 0.304 (0.190) 0.072 (0.055) 0.042 (0.057)
Top  legal representative (d) −0.149*** (0.025) 0.073 (0.095) −0.132*** (0.024) −0.135*** (0.024)
Alleged infringer × U.K.
Small (d) 0.228 (0.182)
Medium (d) 0.034 (0.217)
Large  (d) −0.168 (0.125)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) −0.375*** (0.052)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) 0.261 (0.169)
Patent  holder
Non-practicing entity (d) 0.090* (0.048) −0.089 (0.087) 0.060 (0.045) 0.078* (0.045)
Small  (d) 0.111* (0.059) −0.163 (0.102) 0.067 (0.055) 0.099* (0.057)
Medium (d) 0.060 (0.057) −0.148 (0.137) 0.011 (0.053) 0.045 (0.055)
Large  (d) 0.067 (0.051) −0.123 (0.137) 0.027 (0.047) 0.053 (0.049)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.045 (0.033) 0.126 (0.109) 0.049 (0.030) 0.037 (0.032)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) 0.111*** (0.040) −0.044 (0.100) 0.088** (0.037) 0.103*** (0.039)
Top  legal representative (d) 0.029 (0.032) 0.021 (0.079) 0.026 (0.030) 0.025 (0.030)
Patent  holder × U.K.
Small (d) −0.258* (0.145)
Medium (d) −0.309** (0.122)
Large  (d) −0.182 (0.125)
Europe (excl. domestic) (d) 0.263** (0.125)
World  (excl. Europe) (d) −0.103 (0.137)
Invalidity history
Patent solidiﬁed (opp. proc.) (d) −0.017 (0.035) −0.113 (0.088) −0.022 (0.033) −0.026 (0.033)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) 0.245*** (0.056) −0.221*** (0.053) 0.164*** (0.051) 0.165*** (0.053)
Litigation value (in D , log) −0.022* (0.012) 0.070*** (0.024) −0.008 (0.011) −0.015 (0.012)
Controls
Year  effects Yes No Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.316 0.115 0.125
Observations 2020 287 2307 2307
Marginal effects reported; standard errors in parentheses;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Notes: The DE sample consists of all infringement proceedings without judgment during the ﬁrst 120 days or settlement after the ﬁling of an invalidity
action. The U.K. sample consists of all infringement proceedings without settlement after the ﬁling of a validity challenge counter-claim. The dependent
variable is equal to one if the case settled. The unit of observation is at the patent-case-level. Cases with multiple patents are weighted to account for
oversampling. Baseline litigant size: micro. Baseline litigant residence: domestic (Germany/U.K.). Patent characteristics not reported in the table include
patent  age (in years), patent age (in years, squared), patent and non-patent backward citations, forward citations (in ﬁrst 3 years), number of International
Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) subclasses, patent family size, grant lag (diff. from mean in months), indicators for international PCT applications, EP patents, and
accelerated examination. Technology effects include indicators for each main technology area (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry, mechanical
engineering, other). Court effects include indicators for each German and U.K. court.* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
6. ConclusionProponents of bifurcation argue that exclusive jurisdiction over patent validity offers the advantage of specialization
which should result in more legal certainty regarding the validity of patents. The ﬂipside of bifurcation is that it requires
additional cost for a validity challenge compared to a non-bifurcated system. Perhaps more surprisingly, our empirical
analysis also shows that bifurcation can generate additional costs for alleged infringers (and beneﬁts for patent holders) due
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o the relatively frequent occurrence of an injunction gap. Our theoretical analysis shows that if we  take these various effects
f bifurcation into account, the theoretical predictions are less clearcut than what one might have expected. That is, ex ante
t is in fact unclear whether the non-bifurcated system is preferable over the bifurcated system. We  ﬁnd that the impact
f bifurcation on the patent holder’s propensity to sue for infringement is ambiguous; the impact of bifurcation on both
ettlement amounts and rates is also ambiguous. Nevertheless, the theory offers one clear prediction: bifurcation results in
 ‘validity-challenge deterrence’ effect.
Our empirical analysis sheds more light on the comparison of bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems. We  ﬁnd strong
vidence that alleged infringers are less likely to challenge the validity of an allegedly infringed patent in the bifurcated
ystem everything else equal. Since this effect is driven by the additional cost of ﬁling and pursuing an invalidity claim at a
eparate court, this effect affects smaller, more resource-constrained companies more. Our data do not permit us to analyze
he impact of this ‘validity-challenge deterrence’ effect on innovative activities, but it is possible that this effect dampens
ncentives to innovate in particular among smaller ﬁrms. The lower likelihood of facing an invalidity challenge might also
ncrease the incentives to obtain and enforce weak patents. We  do not investigate such strategic effects of bifurcation here,
ut this is certainly a topic that deserves further scrutiny.
Our empirical analysis also reveals that parties are more likely to settle in a bifurcated system. This means that, for a
iven level of litigation intensity, litigation costs are probably lower under a bifurcated system. However, a higher settlement
ate also implies that the uncertainty over the scope and validity of patents may  be higher under a bifurcated system,
hich may  lead to a higher litigation intensity.45 Finally, a bifurcated system arguably generates higher administrative costs
ompared to a non-bifurcated system. From this perspective, training and appointing judges with a technical background
hile maintaining a uniﬁed court may  be superior to using a bifurcated system.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Online Appendix associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
.jebo.2016.08.005.
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